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Introduction 
Zimbabwe officially abandoned financial repression when it introduced financial 
liberalisation in 1991. Since independence in 1980, the government had used interest 
rate controls and strict foreign exchange regulations in order to control the economy. 
This mini-dissertation will analyse financial reforms in Zimbabwe from 1991 to 1997. 
The analysis will consider whether there were statistical grounds to believe that the 
financial liberalisation hypothesis would work. That is, do real interest rates in 
Zimbabwe have a statistically significant and positive relationship with real money 
demand and real savings? This paper will show that in Zimbabwe this relationship 
does indeed exist. The existence of such a relationship suggests that the freeing of 
interest rates in 1991 should have raised savings and financial intermediation as the 
theory predicts. However, as this did not happen, this paper will put forward reasons 
why, from 1991 to 1997, lifting controls in the economy did not increase savings as 
expected. 
Chapter outline 
Chapter one discusses the literature on financial repression and financial 
liberalisation. The chapter is divided into two sections. The first section defines 
theoretical concepts and attempt to explain the implications of replacing financial 
repression with financial liberalisation. The second section presents a general 
discussion of financial reform in Sub-Saharan African countries. The particular 
experience of Kenya will also be looked at as a specific study. 
Chapter two presents a general picture of macroeconomic trends in Zimbabwe from 
1980 to 1997. The purpose of this presentation is to provide background information 
before performing any analysis in the ensuing chapters. 
Chapter three considers why Zimbabwe did not see a radical policy change in its 
financial sector policy during the first decade of independence. In other African 
countries an attempt was made to 'Africanise' the financial sector. In Zimbabwe, 
however, no such attempts were made to change the characteristic of the financial 
sector. In particular, the commercial banking sector retained both its oligopolistic 
structure and its foreign ownership. The chapter will also show that the government 
extensively used financial repression during the first decade of independence. 
By 1990 the government could no longer afford to run a policy of financial 
repression. The period of financial reforms would begin in 1991. 
The reforms of 1991 were largely based on the McKinnon-Shaw model of financial 
liberalisation. A chief objective of such reforms is using real deposit rates to boost the 
volume of savings. Chapter four tests empirically whether a significant relationship 
exists between real deposit rates and savings in Zimbabwe. 
Chapter five shows that financial liberalisation did not succeed because certain pre-
requisites were not in place prior to liberalisation. These include the absence of 
macroeconomic stability and supervisory regulations. From these shortcomings 




1. 1. Review of Theoretical Concepts 
The main concepts in the financial development literature will be discussed in this 
section. This discussion will focus on explaining terms such as 'financial repression', 
'financial deepening' and 'financialliberalisation'. 
1.1.1 Financial Repression 
a) Definition 
The phrase financial repression originates from the work of Ronald McKinnon (1973) 
and Edward Shaw (1973). It was used to describe a developing country environment 
whereby the financial system ..... .is repressed (kept small) by a series of government 
interventions that have the effect of keeping very low (often at negative levels) 
interest rates that domestic banks can offer to savers (Agenor & Mantel 1996, 
p.152)". These 'government interventions' are often in the form of interest rate 
regulations, directed credit schemes and high reserve ratios. 
McKinnon notes that directed credit schemes can involve the government actively 
channelling the bulk of loanable funds available in the economy to certain 
enclaves .... such as marketing boards and publicly controlled utilities. Even ordinary 
government deficits on current account frequently pre-empt the limited lending 
resources of the deposit banks (p.68)." Such government control over credit rationing 
means that finance for the rest of the economy must be extracted from the shallow 
resources of moneylenders, pawnbrokers and co-operatives. Effectively, the rest of 
the economy is financially repressed since it cannot gain access to capital finance. 
This dearth of capital finance consequently impedes further financial development. 
b) Consequences of repression 
Financial repression has commonly been associated with financial dis-intermediation. 
Interest rate ceilings encourage financial dis-intermediation as savers switch from the 
acquisition of claims on the banking system to the accumulation of real assets, assets 
traded in informal markets, and foreign assets1• In response to this, the imposition of 
foreign controls is often the knee-jerk reaction on the part of governments and with it 
comes certain problems such as the burgeoning of informal markets2• Financial dis-
intermediation is characterised by: 
• Reduced pool of savings 
Ironically, while dis-intermediation is associated with a greater inducement to hold 
real assets such as real estate and gold, it is not associated with high levels of 
investment. While the notional demand for investment may be high, many prospective 
investors will be unable to secure financing since repression has reduced the pool of 
available savings3. 
• Increased cost of credit 
Paradoxically, a repressed financial system can actually lead to an increase in the cost 
of credit resulting from legal restrictions designed to lower this cost. Where there are 
excess credit demands, an unorganised financial sector4 is encouraged (McKinnon 
1980). Because this unorganised market does not provide the legal guarantees 
provided to depositors and others in the organised system, the supply price of credit to 
this market tends to include default risk that depositors and others would not demand 
in the organised market. Hence there is a 'default spread' which raises the cost of 
credit in such markets. 
Furthermore, those borrowers fortunate enough to receive formal bank loans can act 
as moneylenders to customers without direct access to bank credit. In such a scenario, 
a dual financial system develops. Transaction costs are duplicated and a nepotistic 
credit system is encouraged outside organised and supervised institutions. 
• Inefficient capital markets 
Interest rate controls encourage the use of non-price rationing devices. In so doing 
1 Agenor & Monte!, p.l56 
2 Mathieson & Rojas-Suarez 1993 
3 Although interest rate ceilings lower the cost of borrowing funds, there are insufficient funds 
available since the low interest rates are unattractive to potential savers. 
4 It is often referred to as an 'extra-bank market' since it operates illegally. 
they diminish the efficiency of capital markets in allocating 'investible' resources to 
their most productive uses. 
Capital finance will not necessarily go to the projects offering the highest returns at 
the margin. In fact, loan rate ceilings discourage financial institutions from making 
risky loans, since premia for risk cannot be charged when such ceilings are binding 
(Wilkins 1993, p. 16)." Potentially high-yielding investments are sacrificed because in 
financially repressed economies the low interest rate accommodates investments 
which yield returns barely above the interest rate ceiling. This may indeed be the m~st 
adverse consequence of interest rate control. 
c) Why do government's use financial repression? 
Governments in developing countries continue to use financial repression despite its 
adverse effects. The literature offers a plethora of reasons to explain why 
govenunents opt for repression even if this policy has been responsible for reducing 
the real size of the financial system relative to non-financial magnitudes',s. 
The first reason is that low interest rates are associated with high social benefits. This 
association can assume one of three forms: 
• Keynes (1936) contends that, if left alone, the interest rate does not adjust to a 
level conducive to social advantage. Therefore a wise government is concerned 
to curb it by statute and custom and even by invoking the sanction of moral law 
(p.351)." 
• Harvey (1991) suggests that governments use repression to get credit flowing to 
neglected sectors, more cheaply and longer term, while 
• Killick (1991) notes that a strong anti-usury tradition in some Islamic countries 
prohibits the charging of interest for loans. 
The revenue that governments can generate from financial repression is anothu 
reason why this policy is used. Fry (1982), suggests instead that many developing 
countries inadvertently" used financial repression when the initial intended policy 
5 Shaw 1973, pp.3-4 
was that of 'financial restriction'. A policy of financial restriction encourages 
institutions from which government can expropriate a large seigniorage, and 
discourages all others.6 Where such financial restriction has been successful, we find: 
• a higher proportion of funds from the financial system are transferred to the public 
sector, 
• a rightward shift in the demand for money function is accompanied by higher 
income and lower cost elasticities. 
Fry notes that the above changes permit a greater public sector deficit to be financed 
at a given rate of inflation and a given level of nominal interest rates. 
A second revenue source is the implicit subsidy from which the government benefits 
by obtaining access to bank financing at below-market interest rates."7 Giovannini & 
de Melo (1993) also allude to the implicit tax collected through the banking system on 
private sector bank deposits that are remunerated at below-market interest rates. 
1.1.2 Financial Liberatisation 
This section will focus on the concept of financial liberalisation. Related issues such 
as 'financial deepening' and 'financial intermediation' will also be explained in this 
section. 
a) Definition 
Financial liberalisation has commonly been associated with the mere freeing of 
interest rates. However, our understanding of financial liberalisation today extends 
beyond the elimination of directed credits and high reserve requirements. 
Financialliberalisation is now understood to involve a wider set of objectives. These 
objectives include: 
• the easing of portfolio restrictions, changes in the ownership of banks, 
6 Fry gives the following as examples: high reserve requirements and obligatory holdings of 
government bonds are imposed to tap this source of saving at zero or low interest cost to the public 
sector; private bond markets are suppressed through transaction taxes and an 'unconducive' legal 
framework since private bond and equities do not easily yield seigniorage; interest rate ceilings are 
imposed to stifle competition from the private sector. 
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• enhanced competition among banks, 
• integration of domestic entities to international markets, as well as 
• changes in the monetary policy environment (Agenor & Montel1996 ). 
While the relative importance of each of the above objectives and the speed of the 
refonn process may vary between countries, in all cases such refonns have been 
motivated by the need to pursue stabilisation and broader structural refonn objectives 
in an efficient and effective manner. 
b) Financial intermediation and financial deepening 
For developing countries the chief reason the McKinnon-Shaw approach has been so 
central in policy-making is because of its recognition that 'finance matters for 
development'. While mainstream analysis of money and finance in the growth process 
neglected an independent role for such factors, the McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis states 
that the lack of 'financial deepening' is a relevant obstacle to development. 
The concept of 'financial intennediation' helps to explain what is meant by a lack of 
'financial deepening'. As Gillis et al (1983, p.323) testify, the process of financial 
intermediation involves the gathering of savings from multitudinous savers and 
channelling them to a smaller but still sizeable number of investors." 
The main advantage of intermediation is that financial intennediaries exploit 
economies of scale in lending and borrowing. For example, the lending intennediary 
can invest and manage investments in primary securities at unit costs far below the 
experience of most individual lenders, while the borrowing mtennediary benefits 
from having a relatively predictable schedule of claims for repayment. Gurley & 
Shaw (1960) observe that these economies of scale can then be distributed to: 
• the intennediary's debtors in the fonn of favourable lending tenns, 
• its creditors in the form of attractive interest payments, and 
• its stockholders in the form of sufficient dividends to attract additional capital 
funds. 
7 Agenor & Mantel, p.157. 
11 
The conclusion we draw is that the greater the extent of financial intermediation in an 
economy, the greater the level of financial deepening. A lack of 'financial deepening', 
however, implies that the market for the intermediation of funds are incomplete and 
imperfect. Consequently, growth will be hindered because under incomplete and 
imperfect markets some contracts between savers and investors will not be possible or 
will stipulate wrong prices. A lack of financial deepening thus results in a paucity of 
savings and the mis-allocation of investment resources. 
While both McKinnon and Shaw agree that 'finance matters', they express different 
views on the exact nature of the relationship between finance and development. 
• McKinnon's complementarity hypothesis 
In explaining his 'basic complementarity between money and physical capital', 
McKinnon contends that for semi-industrialised economies, real money balances are 
complements rather than substitutes for tangible investment. Thus, McKinnon's 
'complementarity hypothesis', rests on two assumptions: 
1) all economic units are confined to self-finance; and 
2) indivisibilities in investment are of considerable importance, that is investment 
expenditures are lumpier than consumption expenditures. 
What emerges from this hypothesis is that any individual intending to invest in 
physical capital must first accumulate money balances, that is, outside money. 
Hence, the more attractive the process of accumulating money, or the higher the real 
deposit rate of interest, the greater the incentive to invest. Furthermore the relative 
lumpiness of investment expenditure implies, in this situation, that aggregate demand 
for money will be greater, the larger the proportion of investment in total expenditures 
(Fry 1982, p.733)." 
• Shaw's debt-intermediation view 
Shaw on the other hand, contends that the theory of finance in developing countries 
should adopt a 'debt intermediation' view. This view is based on an inside money 
12 
model where investors are able to borrow from savers. Thus, in contrast to 
McKinnon's 'complementarity hypothesis', economic agents are not constrained by 
'internal finance' since 'external finance' exists. 
Shaw's emphasis on credit contrasts with conventional monetary economics which 
has a bias in favour of the assets side of the economy (Agenor & Montel). According 
to Shaw, a higher real deposit rate will attract a greater volume of savings deposits. 
These additional savings deposits enlarge the supply of credit funds available. This 
enlarged pool of credit is then used to accommodate a greater level of investment 
demand. Not only does the quantity of investment increase, but so too does the quality 
since the greater financial intermediation increases the average efficiency of 
investment8. 
c) Pre-requisites for financialliberalisation 
It is now accepted that financial liberalisation is futile in the absence of certain pre-
requisites. Villanueva & Mirakhor (1990) name these pre-requisites as 
macroeconomic stability, strong and effective system of bank supervision and the 
gradual removal of controls on interest rates. 
Furthermore, the correct sequencing of these prerequisites is crucial. The Villanueva-
Mirhakor framework, widely used as the benchmark by in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), 
suggests four approaches for correctly liberalising interest rates: 
1. unstable economies with inadequate bank supervision should first achieve 
macroeconomic stability and strengthen the bank supervisory framework before 
liberalising interest rates; 
2. unstable economies with adequate bank supervision should ensure economic 
stability, maintain firm bank supervision and embark on gradual interest rate 
deregulation; 
3. stable economies with inadequate bank supervisory stability should boost bank 
8 With more investments to consider financing, intermediaries gradually learn to distinguish between 
good quality investments and shoddy ones. 
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supervision and temporarily regulate interest rates before embarking on interest rate 
liberalisation; 
4. immediate interest rate liberalisation is recommended only for countries that have 
both macroeconomic stability and adequate bank supervisory framework. 
To the list of pre-requisites, Agenor & Mantel (1996) add institutional factors such as 
the Jegal infrastructure, the bankruptcy code and the disclosure and prudential 
regulations. They acknowledge that such institutional factors influence the quality of 
the infrastructure for financial transactions. By this, they refer to both the systemic 
elements and the operational efficiency of firms in the financial sector (p.15)." 
• Systemic factors 
Of the systemic factors, the one relating to the imperfections in the functioning of the 
legal and regulatory framework stands out in particular since it raises both ex ante and 
ex post costs of contracting9. These imperfections are not confined merely to 
difficulties in designing contracts, defining property rights and consummating 
contracts, but also include the degree of efficiency and the moral fibre of the judiciary 
system. 
The existence of such difficulties breeds 1nstitutional uncertainty' which adversely 
increases the degree of credit risk. Under certain states of nature, such 1nstitutional 
uncertainty' may induce a disproportionate increase in the amount of the external 
fmance premium. Indeed in extreme cases, this premium charged for the financial 
instrument can climb so high that the market for the financial instrument disappears 
altogether. 
Another systemic factor pertains to the quality of accounting and auditing standards. 
Often, financial contracts are left unsigned due to the dearth of reliable and credible 
information. Such shortages of information worsen the asymmetry of information 
dilemma. 
9Ex ante costs arc incurred because the contract must be drafted before the transaction takes place wh.ile 
ex post costs are incurred in securing tbe deal as originally struck. 
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• Operational factors 
With respect to the operational efficiency of the finns perfonning the intennediation 
of funds, the issue of allocative efficiency is a decisive one. To maximise the markets' 
operational efficiency, the firm needs to allocate funds at the minimum possible 
expense. 
To achieve allocative efficiency, the risk-adjusted cost of funds must be the same for 
all borrowers. Similarly, the rate of return offered to savers must be also be consistent. 
However, deviations from operational and allocative efficiency exist due to a certain 
degree of market power exerted by banks, the existence of market segmentation and 
difficulties in exploiting fully the economies of scale because of the smallness of 
domestic markets (Mehran et al 1998, p.16)." 
For financial liberalisation to succeed, therefore, refonns must be implemented in a 
milieu where macroeconomic stability and a strong and effective system of bank 
supervision are in place. Where macroeconomic stability and correct sequencing of 
refonns are absent, financial Jiberalisation is often associated with sharp increases in 
real interest rates, bankruptcy of financial institutions and the loss of monetary control 
(Agenor & MonteJ, p. 477)." The logic underpinning this argument is that 
macroeconomic instability raises the risk of projects funded by banks. As a result, the 
riskiness of bank portfolios also rises. According to the Stiglitz-Weiss (1992) model 
of credit rationing under conditions of information asymmetry, banks wilJ respond by 
lowering interest rates and rationing credit more severely if deposit insurance is 
absent or correctly priced. However, where deposit insurance is inadequately priced, 
moral hazard induces banks to raise interest rates to attract deposits and fund high-risk 
projects. This, notes Agenor & Montel, is because banks face a one-way bet: if the 
projects pay off, bank owners reap the profits, whereas if they do not, the government 
foots the bill to pay off depositors, with bank owners risking only their limited capital 
(p.478)." Furthennore, where macroeconomic instability persists, it is highly likely 
that bank portf'olios already harbour a large number of bad loans. In such situations, 
bank capital is impaired and the moral hazard problems associated with deposit 
insurance are accentuated . Consequently, lending rates reach unusually high levels, 
finns engage in distress borrowing and bankruptcies spread. 
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d) Direct versus Indirect Monetary Control 
Traditionally, 'financial sector reform' has been synonymous with the liberalisation of 
interest rates, the proliferation of new money and capital market instruments, and the 
improvement of systems of regulation and supervision (Roe & Sowa 1997). However, 
an additional element has been appended to 'financial sector reform', namely the 
abandonment of direct methods of monetary control in favour of indirect or market 
based methods. 
Financial liberalisation can proceed independently of a decision to adopt incUrect 
methods of monetary control, it is unlikely that the countries where direct controls 
are retained will be able to reap the full benefits of financial reform in terms of deeper 
and more adaptable financial sectors (Roe & Sowa, p.214)." 
The link between direct monetary control and financial repression is clear. Direct 
controls not only provide governments with tools to manipulate the volumes of the 
main monetary aggregates, but they also afford 'dirigiste' governments an opportunity 
to combine their attempted control over monetary aggregates with the ability to 
direct credit in very specific ways (Roe & Sowa, p.216)." However, even the more 
unyielding regimes are beginning to steer themselves away from direct controls. Why 
is this? 
The first reason is that direct controls result in high administration costs. As Bhagwati 
(1978) testifies, direct controls are 'cumbersome' and expensive to administer since 
credit limits have to be defined and monitored at the level of each individual bank. 
Related to this, direct controls have proved an uncomfortable choice in financial 
systems with a modicum of scope for innovation. As Llewellyn et al (1982) attest, 
controls on particular financial institutions have encouraged the growth of new, un-
taxed, non-traditional banking institutions. In such situations, the authorities are left 
with the choice of either allowing the financial sector to operate on a dualistic basis-
one part controlled and the other part largely uncontrolled-or of extending their costly 
bureaucratic net to match each and every new innovation as it occurs (p.217)." 
The second argument is that direct controls force banks to adopt portfolio positions 
dissimilar from those they would choose if there were no controls in place. Indeed the 
familiar bigh risk, high return' configuration is distorted as politicians demand of 
banks to lend more to the higher risk but lower return sector. The banks are not 
compensated for this additional burden through some form of direct budgetary 
transfer (but are instead) subjected to high rates of implicit taxation through high 
reserve requirements among others (Roe & Sowa, p.217)." Furthermore, the economy 
is robbed of the benefits associated with the delegated screening and monitoring of 
credit risks; benefits which are available in more liberal systems. 
Financial sector reform seeks to increase the size, improve the efficiency and 
strengthen the risk management of financial systems. While the drift towards indirect 
controls has not traditionally been included in financial reform policy packages, the 
preceding discussion has shown how the continued existence of direct controls 
mitigates against the objectives of financial reform. At the same time, indirect 
controls aid financial reform policies as they assist commercial banking institutions in 
the policing of 'risk and return' and in the allocation of credit. 
1.2 Empirical Review 
SSA countries have historically attached greater importance to developing their 
respective real sectors. The financial sector's role has largely been peripheral. 
Evidence lies in the fact that soon after independence, most SSA countries strongly 
believed that they could support their development objectives through selective credit 
allocation mechanisms (Mehran et al1998, p.1)." Consequently, governments in these 
countries assumed the role of chief player in the operations of their respective 
financial sectors. Nearly all the governments went as far as setting up financial 
institutions to ensure that the monetary and financial system aided their development 
objectives (Harvey 1991). Such a policy constituted a form of financial repression. 
1.2.1 The era of financial repression in SSA 
This section will briefly explain why SSA countries opted for financial repression 
policies upon attaining independence. The nature of repression as well as its adverse 
consequences will also be assessed in this section. 
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a) Reasons for financial repression 
While financial repression would eventually unravel, at independence it seemed the 
wisest policy to pursue for the fledgling SSA states because: 
• during the colonial era, commercial banking had been set up primarily to finance 
foreign trade (Seidman 1986); 
• any local financing engaged in by the banks was either to assist foreign-owned 
companies or companies owned by the non-African business communities 
(Harvey 1991); 
• building societies provided housing finance for the better off, entirely in the main 
towns (while) ...... agricultural finance companies lent to white settlers, and 
(perhaps) to a few improved African farmers (Harvey 1991, p.258)." 
Effectively, these financial systems served the special enclaves of urban whites, white 
settlers, foreign trade and foreign business. Africans and their development objectives 
were totally excluded from this system. At independence, therefore, the African 
leaders resolved to get credit flowing to the African population by using the policy of 
financial repression. 
b) The character of repression in SSA 
As Harvey notes, financial repression initiatives undertaken in the SSA countries were 
of three main types:-
i) macroeconomic measures such as interest rate policy and exchange rate controls 
ii) changing the behaviour of the existing commercial banks 
iii) setting up development financial institutions (DFis) 
Under financial repression, the trend in almost all the newly independent SSA states 
was similar. Firstly, the re-routing of bank resources to finance both the budget deficit 
and state-owned enterprises was commonplace (Mehran et al). Simultaneously, 
interest rates were repressed at below the market-clearing rate (often negative in real 
terms) while credit rationing and private sector crowding out was widespread 
throughout the SSA countries. In Malawi for example, because commercial banks 
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were compelled to significantly increase their proportion of lending to agriculture, 
commercial lending to agriculture rose by 50 percent while the sector's share of bank 
advances escalated from 10 percent to 54 percent (Harvey 1991). 
Foreign exchange restrictions were also synonymous with the financial repression 
policies. The principal motive behind choking the free flow of foreign exchange was 
to augment the pool of finance available to local borrowers. Indeed the Govenor of 
the Bank of Zambia would claim that bank credit to Zambians improved during 1969 
largely as a result of the restrictions on lending to non-Zambians (Bank of Zambia 
Annual Report, 1969)." 
c) Consequences of financial repression 
As much as the governments of the newly-independent SSA countries believed that 
financial repression would confer access to the financial system on their people, it 
simply did not work. 
While financial repression crippled the banking system, the financial intermediation 
process was also severely undermined. While it is true that money was already rapidly 
losing its store of value function, the waning efficiency of the payments system and 
the erosion of financial and borrower discipline were further impediments. 
Effectively, banks ceased to be a safe haven for savings, (thus) distorting resource 
mobilisation and allocation (Mehran et al, p.2)." Crucially, this financial malaise 
proved an obstacle to economic policy management and performance, while real 
incomes and prices were ruinously affected. 
1.2.2 Financial reform in Kenya 
Encouraged by the IMF and the World Bank, as well as by the success of the 'gang of 
four' states of the Far East10, the SSA states embarked on structural adjustment 
programmes (SAPs). Under these programmes the market mechanism is assigned a 
greater role in the allocation of resources. While their decision to abandon financial 
I 
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repression was hardly surprising given their straitened economic circumstances, the 
SSA countries also hoped that the economic reforms would aid significantly in 
dismantling the myriad of controls and restrictions that had become institutionalised 
in their respective economies. 
In all, nearly twenty SSA countries attempted reform programmes. This empirical 
case study, however, will only review the experience of Kenya. Kenya has been 
selected because the initial conditions in both Kenya and Zimbabwe, prior to 
economic reforms, are very similar. For example, Soyibo (1997) notes that (prior to 
reforms) the financial systems in Zimbabwe and Kenya typified the sub-group of 
financial systems with institutions of mixed ownership11 and whose types of financial 
institutes are fairly diversified (p.2)." 
Apart from South Africa, Kenya and Zimbabwe are credited with having two of the 
most sophisticated financial structures in the region. Both countries already boasted 
institutions such as commercial, merchant and investment banks. In addition to these 
banking firms, there was already in existence a plethora of non-banking financial 
institutions (NBFls) such as insurance companies, finance houses and leasing 
companies. In both countries, a suitably operational stock exchange was also in 
operation 12. 
The study on Kenya will first consider Kenya's economy prior to financial reforms. 
The next stage of the analysis will include a short discussion on the nature of the 
financial reforms as well as an evaluation of their success or failure. 
a) Kenya's Initial Conditions 
Kenya's financial sector had several structural flaws prior to financial reform: 
• There appeared to be a destabilising bias in favour of NBFis. Between 1971 and 
1979, the growth of NBFis was encouraged by the utilisation of differential 
10 Singapore, Taiwan, Hong Kong and South Korea 
11 'Mixed ownership' recognises that there are a significant number of privately owned jnstitutions 
operating alongside public ones. This is in contrast to countries such as Tanzania, Malawi and 
Mozambique whose financial systems are largely controlled by government-owned institutions 
12 In the majority of SSA economies, NBFis are few while capital and stock markets are absent. 
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interest rate regulations between them and commercial banks. As Ngugi & Kaburo 
(1994) attest, being able to charge more on loans and other charges, NBFis 
attracted a greater share of deposits than commercial banks. Thus NBFis grew at 
the expense of commercial banks. 
• The financial system was characterised by a high level of concentration. Grosh 
(1990) notes that of the 161 bank branches in Kenya as at 30 June 1983, 123 of 
them (76 percent) belonged to the four largest banks13• Added to this high level of 
concentration was the direct participation of the government in the financial 
system as a chief owner. 
• Just as the Nigerian government attempted to 'Nigerianise' its financial system 
(Seidman 1986), the government in Kenya also believed that usurping control of 
commercial banking would be more responsive to the borrowing needs of 
Kenyans of African ongm (Soyibo, p.122)." In the period 1970-71 various 
indigenous banks were spawned. One such bank was the Kenya Commercial Bank 
(KCB) which managed to expand lending to Kenyan Africans by 225 percent 
(Soyibo) in one year. These banks usually operated beneath the yoke of political 
pressure. For example, the (KCB) was perpetually pressured to grant credit to 
politicians and their cronies. It was also 'persuaded' to supply credit to other 
government parastatals without adhering to commercial bonus mores (Grosh). 
Consequently, this bank's portfolio was saddled with non-performing loans. 
b) The Move to Reforms 
According to Ngugi & Karubo's testimony, the main impetus behind the reform 
programme were the divergent regulatory framework across financial institutions, 
inadequate and weak prudential supervision, and weak monetary control (cited in 
Soyibo, p.125)." 
On interest rate liberalisation, Kenya appeared to favour 'gradualism' rather than the 
'Big Bang' approach. This entailed implementing the harmonisation of interest rate 
regulation of commercial banks and NBFis gradually rather than swiftly. This helped 
allay fears in Kenya that interest rates would increase dramatically. For example, 
J3 Kenya Commercial Bank, Barclays Bank, Standard Chartered and National Bank of Kenya. 
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ceilings on savings deposit rates were raised from 10.0 percent to 13.5 percent for 
both commercial banks and NBFis. Simultaneously, ceilings on bank lending rates 
were increased to 17.5 percent from 15.0 percent while those for NBFis were lifted to 
19.0 percent from 18.0 percent (Soyibo 1997). 
As liberalisation took hold in Kenya, money market changes were soon observed. 
These changes included: 
• The rapid increase in money supply. The rate of real monetary growth escalated 
by 11 percent between 1991 and 1992 (Soyibo). 
• The complete conversion to indirect instruments of monetary policy (Mehran et 
al). Under the previous policy of direct controls, the system of credit ceilings had 
been the foundation of Kenyan monetary policy (Roe & Sowa, p.250)". 
~ ·-. 
However, from November 1990, the treasury bill rate was set at a market price 
detennined by a weekly auction. 
• The freeing of the exchange rate; the exchange rate was no longer controlled 
under the leviathan Foreign Exchange Act but was now detennined using the 
auction system. 
• The introduction of Open Market Operations in early 1992 when daily meetings of 
the open market committee of the Central Bank of Kenya were introduced' 
• The replacement of stringent reserve requirements with a more relaxed 'reserve 
money monitoring' in 1991. 
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c) Performance Evaluation 
The performance of Kenya's economy under financial liberalisation can best be 
described as 'mixed' .The earlier broad-based reforms of the early 1980s produced 
only 'sluggish growth' and Kenya had to wait until after 1986 before enjoying any 
substantive growth. Indeed, this latter period also coincided with single-digit inflation 
and positive real interest rates (Grosh). 
During the initial reform stages, Kenya's representative index of financial deepening, 
the ratio of M2 to gross domestic product, remained at or near the 30 percent mark 
(Table 1 ). This seemed consistent with the McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis. By 1992, the 
index had reached 72 percent 1992 (Soyibo). 
The post 1989 era was not good for Kenya. While the M2/GDP ratio rose, the real 
growth rate of GDP perplexingly slowed down, falling as low as -1.5 percent in 1992. 
In addition to this, inflation soared (see Figure 2), rising into double digits by 1990, 
advancing to 35 percent in the following year, before declining a little to 29.6 percent 
in 1992 (I.MF International Statistics). 
Another source of concern was Kenya's perpetual budget deficit during the period 
after reforms (see Table 2). Such fiscal profligacy served to undermine Kenya's 
macroeconomic stability which has been recognised as a key pre-requisite for a 
successful structural adjustment programme. Such a large deficit may have induced 
the government to finance the deficit by raising its domestic borrowing from the 
banking system. A possible result of this would have been the increased crowding out 
of private sector borrowing, the erosion of capital formation and the stunting of 
economic growth. This may explain Kenya's declining GDP during the reform pe:-iod. 
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Table 1: Ratio of money supply and budget deficit to GDP, Kenya 1981-92 
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4.5% 
Source :Grosh 1990 
8.4% 4.5% 5.2% 6.3% 8.1% 9.3% 
As far as monetary reform is concerned, Kenya successfully completed the transition 
from direct to indirect methods of monetary control. However, other areas in this 
realm remain unsettled: 
• To begin with, there is still very little activity in, or development of, the 
secondary market for government securities (Mehran et al, p.l9)". Furthermore, 
Kenya's notorious inflation legacy has dampened the demand for existing longer-
term goverrunent securities. 
• Secondly, the use of weekly auctions for setting the treasury bill rate has yielded 
only modest results. The auctions were supposed to intensify activity in the money 
market but instead discount rates in the auctions have hardly moved from one 
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week to the next. Commercia! banks for their part have displayed no obvious 
change in their attitudes to the holding of such bills (Roe & Sowa, p.253)." 
In the area of financial legislation and supervision, Kenya has made 'sufficient' 
progress. Along with South Mrica and Botswana, Kenya is recognised as one of the 
three countries which are becoming tougher with poorly and imprudently managed 
institutions (Mehran et al, p.l4)." Considered a regional leader in following best 
practices, Kenya has also managed to set up a credible limited-coverage deposit 
insurance scheme. Added to this, the central bank has been courageous enough to let 
flagging banks fail, fraudulent managers have not escaped prosecution and those 
depositors not covered by deposit insurance schemes have been allowed to lose 
money. The government should also be given credit for Kenya's improving 
supervisory record because it has generally supported rather than overruled the central 
bank. However, there remains scope for improvement. As is the case in all SSA 
countries (with the exception of South Mrica), Kenya does not have an effective court 
system that will ensure enforceability of contracts and enhance banks' financial 




Zimbabwe's Macroeconomy: 1980 to 1997 
This chapter outlines the general structure of Zimbabwe's macroeconomy between 
1980 and 1997. The chapter will focus on trends in the business cycle, monetary 
policy, fiscal policy, and the external accounts. As subsequent chapters will be 
divided into the pre-reform and post-liberalisation era, the purpose of this chapter is 
will be the only chapter to present an overview of the macroeconomy since 
independence. 
2. 1 The business cycle 
The change in GDP growth is used to measure economic activity. Figure 3 compares 
changes in economic growth and per capita incomes for the period 1980-97. 
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Figure 3 highlights some important issues: 
• The country was in a recession from 1982 to 1984. This was largely a result of 
drought which adversely affected agricultural output (Mandaza et al 1986). 
• After 1984 the economy's recovery was rather erratic but positive real growth 
rates were maintained until1992. 
• 1992 was another drought year and the economy experienced its worst downturn 
since independence. The economy shrunk by approximately 9 percent, and real 
incomes also fell. 
• Throughout the period, real incomes have followed the business cycle. 
2.1.1 Investment and the business cycle 
The relationship between economic output and investment has been very close in 
Zimbabwe. Figure 4 presents this relationship for the period 1990 to 1997. 
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2.1.2 Interest rates and the business cycle 
Figure 5 illustrates the relationship between the business cycle and real interest rates. 
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Source: Quarterly Economic & Statistical Review (RBZ) 
2.2 Monetary Policy 
Money supply growth was significantly lower in the 1980s compared to the post-
reform period after 1991. The low money supply of the 1980s is largely attributed to 
the existence of financial repression (Moyo 1998). Various restrictions on the 
activities of financial institutions (see chapter four) limited monetary expansion. 
The low money supply of the 1980s reflects the restrictive monetary policy of this 
decade. Interest rate ceilings, reserve requirements and liquid asset requirements were 
used extensively to limit bank lending, monetary growth and inflation14• 
14 Another possible explanation of the low monetary growth could be the low levels of credit demand 
by borrowers who would have otherwise qualified for bank loans. 
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Figure 6: Zimbabwe's nominal money supply for the period 1980-97 
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Source: Quarterly Economic & Statistical Review, RBZ (various issues) 
2.2.1 Types of money 
There are three types of money supply measures in Zimbabwe. These are Ml, M2 and 
M3: 
• Ml is made up of notes and coins in circulation plus demand deposits with the 
banking system. 
• M2 consists of Ml plus other short- and meclium-term deposits. Short-and 
medium-term deposits are defined as savings deposits plus under 30 day deposits 
with the banking system. 
• M3 consists of M2 plus over 30-day time deposits with the banking sector. 
The composition of Zimbabwe's total money supply is illustrated in Figure 7. 
Two important features stand out in Figure 7: 
• The first is the relatively small size of the currency component of the money 
supply. 
• The second is the growing share of short-and medium-term deposits in the money 
supply. These deposits have grown at the expense of long-term deposits which 
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Source: Quarterly Economic & Statistical Review (RBZ) 
Two distinct phases are highlighted in Figure 8: 
-+-- lnfiation rate 
til- Dscount rate . 
• Real interest rates were negative during the 1980s. Inflation was higher than 
nominal interest rates largely because financial repression kept interest rates 
artificially low. This period indicates an era of unsuccessful monetary policy. 
• The second phase shows the conversion to interest rate control. Sharp increases in 
interest rates were supposed to achieve real positive rates. The first increase in 
1991 raised the discount rate from 10 percent to 20 percent in 1991 (RBZ). 
Another increase in 1992 saw interest rates raised by another 9.5 percent. These 
two increases indicate a 20 percentage points increase in the discount rate within a 
space of two years. 
2.3 Fiscal Policy 
This section shows the government's budget policy from 1980 to 1997. The trends 
shown here will focus on the effect of government expenditure on the budget deficit 
and on government debt. 
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2.3.1 Government expenditure 
The percentage of the government's budget to GDP provides a measure of the 
government's size relative to the size of the economy. Figure 9 presents the total of 
central government expenditure and taxes as a percentage of GOP for the years 1980-
97. 
Two issues are apparent from the diagram: 
• The ratio of the government's budget relative to the size of the economy has 
hovered around 30 percent throughout the period. While this does not necessarily 
mean that the budget has been growing (GDP could have fallen instead), it does 
mean that the government has been responsible for one third of Zimbabwe's 
aggregate demand. 
• Government expenditure has persistently exceeded its revenue. This has resulted 
in a constant budget deficit and a rising public debt. 
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2.3.2 Comparative size of government 
--Revenue 
E><penditure 
To put the size of the government's budget into context, we need to compare it to 
other countries. Figure 10 looks at government spending as a percentage of GDP for 
32 
selected countries. To allow for a fair comparison, only countries classified as 
developing economies have been selected. 
Looking at the entire spectrum of countries, Zimbabwe's level of spending is high. 
Brazil is ranked as the seventh largest economy in the world (World Bank 1997) and 
yet Zimbabwe's budget relative to its size is twice that of Brazil. 
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Source: Nattrass et al (1995) 
2.3.3 The budget deficit 
35 40 
Figure 11 illustrates the budget deficit relative to government expenditure and GDP 
fer the period 1980-97. Certain features are observed: 
• There has been considerable variation in the budget deficit relative to GDP and 
expenditure. 
• While no short-term patterns have emerged, the long-term trend in the two ratios 
has been constant. 
As Black et al (1997, p.313) note, little concern need exist about the observed 
variability of the budget deficit" since variability can be advantageous. If increases in 
the budget deficit tend to coincide with recessions, and decreases coincide with 
economic booms, then this indicates that the budget is acting as an effective built-in-
stabiliser. 
However, in Zimbabwe's case huge outlays on loss-making parastatals has been 
significant in raising the deficit (Harvey 1998, RBZ 1997). If one refers back to the 
earlier section on the business cycle, one does not find increases in the budget deficit 
to be synchronised with periods of recession. In light of this, Zimbabwe's budget 
deficit is a cause of concern. 
Figure 11: Budget deficit as a percentage of budget and GDP, Zimbabwe 1980-97 
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The size of the debt is as significant as how this deficit is financed. There are three 
sources of funding of the budget deficit in Zimbabwe. These are the banking sector, 
the non-banking sector and the foreign sector. The banking sector consists of the 
Reserve Bank, commercial banks, accepting houses and discount houses while the 
non-banking sector comprises individuals and non-bank corporations. Figure 12 
presents the composition and financing of the budget deficit for the period 1980-97. 
Some observations from the graph merit mention: 
• Borrowing from the banking sector was comparatively low during the 1980s. In 
1986 there was actually an episode of negative borrowing (repayment of debt). 
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This reluctance to borrow from the banking sector is consistent with the restrictive 
monetary policy of this period (see Monetary policy section). 
• Borrowing from the non-banking sector has been the preferred source of financing 
the budget deficit up until 1992. Foreign sector borrowing has fluctuated 
throughout the entire period. This may reflect foreigners' uneasiness to lend to a 
country with a 'high risk' rating. 
• Since 1993 the major source of financing of the budget deficit has been the 
banking sector. At the same time the non-banking sector has been repaid. This 
increase in borrowing from the banking sector is one of the main causes of rapid 
monetary growth during the 1990s. 



























Source: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (1997) 
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The increasing budget deficit has impacted adversely on the public debt. Figure 13 
shows a rising long-term trend in the total public debt as a percentage of GDP. 
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2.4 The balance of payments 
This section looks at Zimbabwe's external account variables. These include the 
nominal and real effective exchange rate, the trade balance and the overall balance of 
payments position. 
2.4.1 Exchange rates 
The trend in Zimbabwe's exchange rate for the years 1980-97 is presented in Figure 
14. The two sets of data refer to the nominal and the real exchange rate. 
The nominal exchange rate simply states the price of one country's currency relative 
to another's. The real exchange rate, however, is a measure of the nominal exchange 
rate adjusted for differences in the inflation rate between countries (Black et al, 
p.281)." The real exchange rate determines a country's degree of international 
competitiveness. A rise15 in the real exchange rate increases competitiveness while a 
fall in the real exchange rate decreases it. 
Some important features are evident in Figure 14: 
15 The real exchange rate is defined as REX= eP*/P, where e=nominal exchange rate, P*=world prices 
and P=domestic prices. A rise in REX means that the nominal exchange rate is rising faster than 
domestic prices. This means that the country's goods are becoming cheaper and more competitive 
internationally. 
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• The rapid depreciation of the nominal exchange rate accelerated after 1990. 
• The trend in the real exchange rate has been downward since 1980. This suggests 
that domestic prices have risen faster than the nominal exchange rate's 
depreciation. 
The falling real exchange rate indicates that Zimbabwe's international 
competitiveness has declined since 1980. This decline would be expected to induce an 
increase in imports relative to exports. Figure 15 indicates that this happened in 
Zimbabwe. Imports have been significantly higher than exports since 1990 and the 
trade balance has deteriorated16• 
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The brief survey of Zimbabwe's macroeconomy highlighted the following: 
• The economy experienced negative growth rates in 1984 and 1992. Severe 
drought was identified as a major cause of this. Economic growth in other years 
was erratic and low. 
• Monetary policy was restrictive during the 1980s. The authorities' attempt to 
control inflation accounted for this policy stance. Financial repression kept 
nominal interest rates artificially lower than inflation during this decade while 
money supply expanded rapidly in the 1990s. Financial repression was abandoned 
in 1991 and, since then, positive real interest rates have been achieved by keeping 
nominal rates above inflation. The share of long-term deposits in total money 
supply has been steadily declining. 
• The government's budget relative to the size of the economy is high by 
developing world standards. Government revenue has been consistently lower 
than government expenditure. This has resulted in an increasing budget deficit and 
public debt. This deficit was financed mainly by the non-banking sector during the 
1980s. This was consistent with the passive monetary policy of the period. 
However, since 1992 the deficit has been financed mostly by the banking sector. 
39 
• The country)s international competitiveness has waned markedJy since 1980. This 
lack of competitiveness has reduced exports relative to imports. The trade balance 
has consequently deteriorated. The capital account has recorded negative net 
capital flows. The current account and capital account deficits have caused an 
overall balance of payments; this deficit has been financed through the running 
down of the country's foreign exchange reserves. 
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Chapter Three 
The period of financial repression: 1980 to 1990 
Independence in many SSA countries saw an immediate attempt to 'indigenise' the 
financial sector in these states. This chapter will present the argument that in the first 
decade of independence, no attempt was made by the authorities in Zimbabwe to 
increase indigenous participation in the financial sector. 
The first part of this chapter will argue that the economic boom in the immediate post-
independence period helped to prevent calls for the immediate 'indigenisation' of the 
financial sector. Mugabe's policy of reconciliation also served to confinn that the 
oligopolistic, foreign nature of the banking sector would remain intact. Consequently, 
while the new government advocated socialism, the issue of financial sector policies 
was not a feature of any official government economic policy or pronouncements. 
The second part of the chapter will show that a combination of droughts and capital 
outflows ended the earlier economic boom. At this stage the govenunent decided to 
increase its expenditure in order to achieve its aim of economically empowering its 
African constituency. However, at no stage did the government forcefully direct the 
financial sector into lending to indigenous businessmen or rural fanners. Moral 
suasion was used, along with various tools of financial repression (inherited from the 
previous government) such as interest rate controls and foreign exchange restrictions. 
However, the failure of finaJ?-cial repression would eventually force the government 
;nto introducing financial refonns. 
3. 1 The initial post-independence period 
At independence in 1980, many observers expected Zimbabwe's financial sector 
policies to reflect the goverrunent's stated populist agenda. As in the other SSA 
countries, the new government faced demands from its African support base. These 
demands included new jobs, higher incomes and basic social development. It was 
expected that changes in the financial sector would complement the government's 
own efforts to satisfy these demands. For example, the ability to borrow from 
commercial banks was expecteo to develop and empower blacks both socially and 
economically. 
The signs during the first two years after independence seemed very promising. 
During this period, Zimbabwe enjoyed a massive economic upswing as the few 
selected macroeconomic indicators shown in Table 2 reveal. 
Table 2: Percentage change in selected macroeconomic indicators in Zimbabwe, 
1980-82 (%) 







The boom of 1980-82 had little to do with changes in the financial sector. Instead, 
Mandaza et al (1987) believe that the boom was a fortuitous windfall from largely 
transient factors such as: 
• A once-off terms-of-trade boon with the lifting of sanctions; The lifting of 
sanctions would have also renewed access to external capital finance. 
• A high excess of 25 per cent meant that large increases in production output could 
be achieved fairly quickly. 
• The particularly good rains of 1980 and 1981 impacted favourably on agricultural 
production. 
• The effect of various statutory manipulations. Minimum wage legislation raised 
urban wages and salaries while the gazzetting of higher producer prices increased 
agrarian incomes. At the same time, the exodus of whites after the removal of 
overt racial labour legislation saw gains (though small) registered in black 
employment. 
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3.1.1 No immediate changes to financial sector policy 
Chapter one noted that nearly all of the newly independent SSA countries 
immediately tried to use the financial sector to bring about economic change for the 
constituencies that had supported their struggle for independence. However, in 
Zimbabwe's case there was no apparent eagerness to transfonn one of the most 
sophisticated financial systems in sub-Saharan Africa. Despite the imposition of 
United Nations sanctions in 1965 17 foreign-owned commercial banks managed to 
successfully mobilise local savings. These savings were directed into investment 
projects that yielded ten years of relatively high growth rates (Seidman 1986). This 
explains the expansion of the financial sector during the UDI era. 
As the National Accounts 18 attest, the financial sector's annual contribution to GDP 
increased six times between 1963 and 1978, exceeding GDP growth twofold. 
Simultaneously, profits of the private financial institutions rose from 1.8 per cent to 
6.9 per cent of the nation's gross operating profits. 
Thus at independence, the new government inherited an efficient financial system 
which had successfully defied UN sanctions. This system had well-managed 
commercial and merchant banks, discount houses, finance houses and a well-
regulated stock exchange. 
a) Character of banking unchanged 
Two noticeable characteristics of this financial system were the oligopolistic and 
foreign nature of the banking sector. Four foreign-controlled commercial banks 
handled Zimbabwe' s commercial banking business at independence. Nedcor, the 
South African bank, controlled Rhobank while Barclays and Standard were British-
controlled banks. The fourth bank, National Grindlays, catered mainly for British and 
some American interests. 
At independence the status quo remained. This surprised those who had expected 
Zimbabwe to emulate Nigeria's 'Nigerianisation' and Tanzania's 'Nationalisation of 
17 ln 1965, the Rhodesian Prime Minister unilateraUy declared independence (UDI) from Britain. For 
such temerity, international sanctions were imposed on Rhodesia. 
18 Central Statistical Office (CSO), various publications. 
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the Banking System'. After all, the new government's African support base had been 
denied access to commercial credit under the previous regime. Furthermore, the new 
government had assumed office espousing an unequivocal socialist ideology. A 
fundamental socialist notion is that the state should nationalise all means of 
production. 
b) No oflicial fmancial reform policy 
The financial sector in general, and the commercial banks in particular, were not 
prominent in the early major statements of government economic policy. While 
announcements were made that government would encourage savings' institutions to 
extend services to rural areas, nothing substantial materialised. A National 
Development Fund was mooted (GoZ 1981, pp.14-15) but never implemented. 
Similarly, in both 1982 and 1983, a Money & Finance Commission was proposed but 
never established. 
Mugabe instead gave assurances to the white population and business community that 
any changes in policy would be implemented on a gradual basis. When, the 'First 
Five-Year National Development Plan' in 1986 contained no mention of financial 
sector reform, it became clear that as a major policy issue, financial sector reform was 
not on the government's immediate agenda. 
Mugabe's assurances to the white-controlled banking sector contrasted with the policy 
of 'Nigerianisation' adopted in Nigeria's financial sector. Independence in Nigeria 
was followed by the rapid imposition of legal restrictions on foreign banks. This was 
done to increase African participation in the financial sector. 
Through legislation, all foreign banks operating in Nigeria were required to 
incorporate in the country. The Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Act (1977) set 
minimum guidelines for indigenous participation in the financial sector. For example, 
it became a legally binding requirement that 60 per cent of any bank's shares had to 
be held by Nigerian interests. 
In Zimbabwe, however, the government left the 100 per cent foreign ownership of 
commercial banks undiluted. While its purchase of 62 per cent Rhobank, seems to 
() 
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contradict this statement, the purchase must be assessed in context. Firstly, the sale 
took place on a willing buyer-willing seller' basis. Secondly, the price paid by the 
government, (91 per cent of the shares' trading value), was described as very fair' by 
the sellers. Harvey argues that the sale was inevitable as the foreign owners wanted to 
withdraw from Zimbabwe. Possibly, the government bought the shares to maintain 
confidence in the banking system. Another possible explanation is that Rhobank's 
major shareholder was Nedbank, a South African bank. Perhaps the government 
found it politically unpalatable to allow a South African bank to operate inside the 
country. 
In any event, the purchase of the majority shareholding in this commercial bank was 
not motivated by the government's desire to direct its lending operations. Sufficient 
evidence exists to support the above claim: 
• The bank's management was unaltered at acquisition while subsequent new 
directors and senior managers were hired from the private sector. This 
development contrasted sharply with that in other SSA countries where senior 
politicians and civil servants were appointed to head parastatal financial 
institutions. 
• Zimbank did not seem to enjoy a disproportionate share of the banking business 
of non-financial parastatals for such business continued to be shared out among all 
the commercial banks. 
• Throughout the years, the government continued to decrease its shareholding in 
Zimbank 19until by the early 1990s it held less than 50 per cent of the shares. 
Meanwhile, while pressure may have been applied on the other three commercial 
banks to locaJise management, no Jegislation was passed which would have forced 
them to lend to favoured sectors. This contrasts markedly with the Nigerian 
expenence. 
19 It must be acknowledged, however, that the government's own weak ftnancial position may have 
been another reason why it did not take up its rights when new shares were issued by Zimbank. 
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c) Tbe non-appearance of indigenous banks 
Besides the lack of interference with foreign-controlled banks, the expected 
proliferation of new 'indigenous' banks did not happen. A new commercial bank, the 
Bank of Credit and Commerce in Zimbabwe (BCCZ), did come into existence but its 
majority shareholding was foreign. In fact, BCCZ engaged mainly in trade bills and 
loans to government statutory bodies rather than in providing finance to the general 
black population. Plans were announced for BCCZ to extend credit to peasants and 
small African businesses in the previously neglected areas, but as long as BCCZ 
adhered to the same lending criteria as the other commercial banks, this was unlikely 
to happen. 
d) Limited changes to central bank 
The new government's treatment of the Central Bank was also markedly different 
from that of other SSA countries. In Nigeria, the Central Bank was used as an active 
agent of 'Nigerianisation'. For example the Central Bank in Nigeria took concrete 
steps to remedy the widespread complaint that commercial banks discriminated 
against Nigerian borrowers (Seidman, p.82)." In this effort, the bank: 
• attempted to control the sectoral distribution of credit by setting limits to the total 
credit that different sectors could acquire, and 
• tried to stimulate a wider geographical spread of banking by tying approval of 
new urban branches to a definite commitment by applicants to open new rural 
branches. 
Even the profits of commercial banks in Nigeria were regulated by the Central Bank 
as banks were forced to transfer 25 per cent of their net annual profits into a reserve 
fund. 
In Zimbabwe, however, the operations of the Reserve Bank (RBZ) were left largely 
intact. The man seconded by the South African Reserve Bank to head the RBZ under 
the previous regime remained in office for the first two years after independence, 
while one of the RBZ's first tasks was to actually lift the prohibition on remittance of 
profits by transnational corporations. The RBZ made it possible for these companies 
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to remit up to 50 per cent of their after-tax profits, while the commercial banks 
continued to make decisions concerning foreign exchange requests from their clients. 
The RBZ, however, addressed the lack of Mrican personnel in its structures. To 
address this anomaly, the bank focused on developing training schemes for Mrican 
staff. Indeed this was a continuation of the personnel reforms started in 1979 under 
the Muzorewa administration. At no stage did the RBZ attempt to interfere with the 
day-to-day operations of commercial banks or in the banks' use of their profits. 
The relative 'maturity' of the RBZ has in fact been submitted as a reason for the lack 
of any revolutionary changes in Zimbabwe's financial sector. At independence in 
1980, the RBZ had already been in business for 24 years. In other SSA countries, 
political independence coincided with the creation of their central banks. 
Consequently central banks in these countries lacked the institutional authority to 
defend the banking system from government interference. Zimbabwe, on the other 
hand, possessed a thoroughly competent RBZ staff, an established reputation and an 
unyielding belief in market principles. This belief in market principles suited the 
general climate of development opinion which had shifted to support for market-
oriented policies. This situation contrasted to that facing other SSA countries that had 
gained independence in the 1960s when world opinion was still for centralised 
development planning, and a dominant role for the public sector. 
e) The policy of reconciliation 
The new government's reconciliatory approach at independence also helped to protect 
commercial banks from government intervention. Zimbabwe's comparatively late 
independence allowed the new leaders to contemplate the heavy costs of unsound 
government intervention. In Mozambique 90 per cent of whites left at independence 
and took with them any hopes of post-war economic prosperity. Zambia and Kenya 
had also suffered economically because of their recalcitrant attitude towards 
reconciliation with whites. In Zimbabwe, a similar hard-line attitude would have been 
fatal. Not only was 88 per cent of all marketed agricultural output from white-owned 
farms, but these farms (especially tobacco) accounted for half of the country's exports 
and 35 per cent of formal sector employment. Even manufacturing, which accounted 
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ior a quarter of GDP, was under white ownership and management as it was closely 
linked to agrarian output. 
3.2 1982-1990: The post-independence boom ends 
Initially, there appeared no need for the government to address the issue of banking 
sector reforms. Various factors were given earlier in this chapter to explain the 
impressive two year post-independence growth spurt. This prosperity seemed to buy 
time for the government. As for as long as incomes and private consumption were 
rising, the predominantly rural population was quite content to enjoy the euphoria 
unleashed by independence. However, after 1982, the boom faded. 
3.2.1 Causes of the recession 
The causes of the economic downturn include (Mandaza et al): 
• the capital outflows which followed the lifting of UDI sanctions, 
• the under-utilised capacity that had propelled the initial growth spurt had been 
exhausted and, 
• the severe drought of 1982/83. 
Of the above reasons, the outflow of capital could have had the biggest impact on 
financial sector policy. With the lifting of UDI sanctions in 1980, government 
partially eased exchange controls20 . Table 3 shows the considerable outflows which 
ensued. These increases incorporated higher emigrant and pension remittances, 
payments of interest, profits and dividends. Pension remittances were an inescapable 
charge on natural resources as they were legally guaranteed by the provision of the 
Lancaster House Constitution.21 The effect of such considerable outflows was to 
create considerable disequilibria in the external and fiscal balances. 
20 However, during the 1980s, such emigrant remittances were reduced and in 1983/4 their initial 
liberalisation was reversed. 
21 This document, brokered by the British at Lancaster House in 1979, stated the terms and condjtions 
of Zimbabwe's independence. 
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Table 3: Capital outflows from Zimbabwe, 1980-83 (Z$ Million) 
Source: Quarterly Economic & Statistical Review, RBZ (various issues). 
3.2.2 The character of the recession 
The recession of 1982-84 manifested itself through a cyclical pattern of production 
bottlenecks, job losses, and tremendous pressure on the BOP's current account. In fact 
the inability to sustain imports of essential inputs largely caused these bottlenecks and 
the concomitant joblessness. While the current account deficit grew, real GDP 
declined by 2 per cent in 1982, by 3.5 percent in 1983 before registering a slight 
positive recovery in 1984. 
During the same period, unemployment grew by as much as 3 per cent. Under such 
economic hardship, the realisation of the government's populist ideals was not 
possible. The immediate question facing the government seemed to be how to 
economically empower its African constituency without interfering in the white-
controlled financial domain? 
3.2.3 The government's response 
The government decided that it would compensate for the banking sector's failure to 
provide blacks with credit. This would be achieved by turning the annual government 
budget into the central and independent instrument for resource mobilisation and 
distribution in Zimbabwe (Mandaza et al1986). 
Under optimal conditions, people can borrow from financial markets in order to 
finance their human capital development. Such borrowing would then be repaid from 
the realised future income streams. However, poor people cannot borrow against their 
future income since their lack of collateral carries credibility problems. In such 
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situations, financial markets can be forced to lend to such people or the government 
can provide these funds by itself. The latter seems to apply for the Zimbabwean case. 
Evidence of this lies in the amount of public funds directed to ministries such as the 
Ministry of Co-operatives, and the Ministry of Rural Planning which served as active 
vehicles of resource allocation in favour of the rural black population. Tellingly, 
however, the bulk of the spending was directed towards health and education; two 
areas where human capital development amongst black people had lagged behind the 
rest of the population. 
Thus, in spite of the white-controlled banking sector, the government promised to 
economically empower African people through the populist use of the budget. As a 
consequence of this resolve, the budget would become the major mechanism for the 
structuring of economic and financial policy. Such populist interventions by the 
govenunent were a common feature of budgets, especially during the first ten years 
after independence. The issue of actually 'indigenising' the economy itself, only 
became a prominent issue after 1990. 
3.2.4 Consequences of government's increased spending 
a) Domestic debt 
One serious consequence of this decision was a rising domestic debt. Harvey notes the 
irony of this situation: the govenunent would itself borrow from commercial banks 
and other financial institutions rather than to encourage or force these institutions to 
lend directly to the masses. Incidentally, this arrangement seemed to suit both sides; 
the government 'scored political points' by acting as the sole vehicle of black 
economic emancipation and, since interest payments on government debt are tax-free 
in Zimbabwe, financial institutions generated higher clear profits from their increased 
lending to government. 
b) Increasing inflationary pressure 
A significant effect of the government's escalating domestic debt was that inflationary 
pressure was heightened. Since the domestic public debt was expanding in order to 
finance primarily non-productive activities, it was contributing to inflationary 
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pressures by raising the money supply without expanding the production of real 
goods. 
Figure 17: Monetary banking sector's holding of government stocks and bonds, 
1981-90 (1990=100) 
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At independence, in line with IMF advice to limit inflationary pressure, the RBZ had 
raised the bank rate from 4.5 to 9.5 per cent. At the same time, the average tender rate 
for 91-day bills more than doubled, from 3.57 to 8.18 per cent. This adversely 
affected the government's debt situation as Seidman (1986) notes: 
• The repayment cost for the increased issuance of treasury bills increased by a 
whopping 260 per cent between 1980 and 1982 (Seidman 1986). 
• The interest rate on three-year government stock rose from 9.5 to 13 per cent. 
• The cost of repaying the increased government debt in the form of stocks and 
bonds almost tripled within a space of two years. 
• The debt cost for 1981 alone was 8 per cent of tax revenues for that year. 
• With the exception of education and defence, debt repayment became the largest 
single item of government expenditure. 
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d) lligb private oorrowing costs 
Another problem was the increased burden rising interest rates placed on firms in the 
private sector. This rise in private borrowing costs coincided with other cost increases. 
For example, Harvey reveals that from 1980 to 1982 average depreciation and bank 
charges paid by manufacturing firms rose 45 per cent. Paradoxically, this seemed to 
be more harmful to the few African emergent businesses whose working capital 
outlays were heavily dependent on borrowed funds. Thus, not only was the 
government's own interest bill unacceptably high, but so too was that of small 
emergent businessmen whom the government had committed itself to assisting. 
3.2.5 The use of financial repression 
While the govenunent's expenditure on health, education, social welfare and public 
enterprises rose appreciably, such spending would not solve the immediate need for 
commercial credit. For example, many rural farmers required access to credit 
particularly since the 1980s was characterised by frequent droughts. At the same time 
small emergent businessmen could not expand without financial assistance as their 
profitability dwindled due to low private consumption during drought years. The 
government's response was to use two orthodox tools of financial repression, namely 
foreign exchange controls and interest rate ceilings. 
a) Foreign exchange controls 
Foreign exchange controls in Zimbabwe were not a new phenomenon. During UDI, 
controls to preserve this precious commodity were enforced rigidly and accepted 
stoically. While the new government briefly relaxed these controls immediately after 
independence, the resultant growth of imports proved unsustainable and the 
government's response was to intensify import and foreign exchange controls. 
A crucial spin-off of foreign exchange controls was that they effectively granted the 
government de facto control over the allocation of credit. In this respect Zimbabwe 
was following the precedent of Zambia which had notoriously exhausted its copper 
export revenues in credit allocations to indigenous Zambian producers. Often, the 
difference between profitability and bankruptcy for a producer was determined by that 
producer's ability to procure foreign exchange from the government (Davies 1991). 
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Through generous allocations from the foreign community, the government was also 
in a position to finance indigenous ventures. For example, foreign donor funds were 
used to help finance: 
• The Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC) which specialised in lending to 
indigenous small farms. Thus the AFC provided a service that the commercial 
banks might otherwise have been forced to undertake. From serving only 4400 
African borrowers in 1980, the AFC had expanded its coverage of smaJl African 
farming households to 70 000 by 1984 (Central Statistical Office 1990). 
• The Small Enterprises Development Corporation (SEDCO) which assisted small 
emergent businessmen. At a time when commercia] bank credit was priced at 39 
per cent for prime borrowers, SEDCO was able to provide lending for rural and 
urban borrowers at rates of 21 per cent and 25 per cent respectively. This of 
course was made possible by SEDCO's own ability to borrow from the 
government at a preferential rate of 9 per cent. SEDCO would then use the spread 
to cover the costs of administration, extension work (providing business advice to 
borrowers) and short training courses for clients (Harvey 1998). 
While the AFC and SEDCO were the two main lending bodies, other facilities such as 
the Credit Guarantee Company, also provided a cheaper line of credit for indigenous 
businesses. 
Predictably, the demand for this cheap credit far exceeded its supply. However, 
borrowers preferred queuing for it rather than attempting to obtain expensive credit 
from the commercial banks. With its control over foreign exchange allocation 
allowing it to dictate lending to African borrowers, the government did not need to 
impose directed credit provisions on commercial banks. 
b) Interest rate ceilings 
Interest rate ceilings were wholly inadequate. While ceilings could theoretically 
decrease the cost of borrowing, in practice they did not increase the volume of credit 
extension since the commercial banks were not compelled to deviate from their 
stringent lending criteria. Furthermore, credit ceilings may actually have reduced the 
volume of savings. This would have diminished the pool of resources available for 
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credit22. In fact, the only party that seemed to benefit from this tool of financial 
repression was the government which was able to borrow from the banking sector at 
artificially low rates. 
3.2.6 Need for reform 
By 1990, the government's banking sector policy was beginning to unravel. While 
stealth by its very nature is difficult to document, it was reported that funds procured 
by institutions such as the AFC and SEDCO, were not reaching their intended 
recipients (Harvey 1991). Instead, the temptation to 'round trip' was too great, and 
many beneficiaries of cheap institutional credit simply re-deposited it in commercial 
banks and accrued profits from the spread. For example, borrowing at 5 percent and 
lending at 25 percent could yield a healthy 20 percent profit margin. Paradoxically, 
this practice may have enhanced the profitability of the old commercial banks which 
were also benefiting from the government's failure to license new banks. 
There was also discontent among Zimbabwe's foreign backers over the increased 
costs of government intervention in the financial sector. Perturbed by Zimbabwe's 
persistent double-digit inflation, the IMF demanded financial sector reform. Another 
concern was that Zimbabwe's population growth rate exceeded its real GDP growth 
rate, which effectively meant that living standards were falling. Increasing 
unemployment levels towards the end of the 1980s (CSO 1992) seemed to justify this 
concern. 
The government's own accounts were in a woeful position. By the end of the 1980s: 
• the government's budget deficit as a percentage of GDP was 6.6 per cent; 
• the foreign debt to GDP ratio was near 45.2 per cent; 
• the government's dis-saving rate had reached 20 per cent and 
• the country's stock of reserves had been diminished in covering the growing 
balance of payments shortfalls (RBZ 1993). 
22 The issue of interest rate ceilings and the rate of savings will be the next chapter's focus. 
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The government's attempt at using an interventionist strategy to empower oiack 
Africans had simply not worked. Using total real private consumption as a measure, 
living standards had actually fallen below pre-independence levels.23 In need of 
IMF/WorJd Bank monetary and technical assistance, the government introduced an 
economic structural adjustment programme in 1991. 




Applying the McKinnon-Shaw Hypothesis to Zimbabwe 
This chapter will attempt to empirically test whether there is a statistically significant 
and positive relationship between real interest rates and real savings. 
The McKinnon-Shaw model of fmancial liberalisation states that where such a 
relationship does exist, the freeing of interest rates should improve the degree of 
financial intennediation and financial deepening. The first part of the chapter will 
show that monetary policy between 1980 and 1990 was relatively passive. High fiscal 
spending and inflationary fears were effective constraints on monetary growth. 
However, inflation during this period was still higher than nominal interest rates 
meaning that real deposit rates were negative. It will be shown that the volume of 
gross national savings was adversely affected by these negative real deposit rates. 
The second part of the chapter discusses Zimbabwe's attempt to boost national 
savings and other financial ratios by using the McKinnon-Shaw framework. 
Regression analysis will be used to detennine whether there is a significant and 
positive relationship between the real deposit rate and financial deepening. 
4.1 Monetary policy in Zimbabwe 1980-1990 
Monetary policy entails the manipulation of the stock of money or interest rates with 
the aim of attaining some specific objectives. It also implies the controllability of the 
money supply and the reliability between that money supply and the policy objective. 
Traditionally, monetary policy has four broad objectives; to promote price stability, to 
support balance of payments stability, to encourage employment and to enable 
economic growth. In Zimbabwe, though, the goal of price stability seems to have 
superseded the other three during the 1980s. In fact, a strong argument can be made 
that monetary policy was restrictive in Zimbabwe during the period 1980-90, 
56 
especially if one compares it to monetary policy after 1990 (see Figure 6 in chapter 
two). 
4.1.1 Causes of restrictive monetary policy 
Two factors may explain the contractionary monetary stance during the 1980s: 
• The budget deficit was an effective constraint on monetary growth. As the 
government's deficit escalated in proportion with its expenditure24 , the RBZ was 
forced to contain monetary growth in order to maintain price stability. 
• The existence of a policy of financial repression in the 1980s accounts for the 
second reason. This policy restricted both the number of financial institutions in 
the economy and the holding of foreign currency by citizens. The possession of 
foreign denominated accounts (FCAs) was prohibited while off-shore finance 
trading was particularly low. One consequence of these restrictions was to 
significantly curtail the activity of merchant banks. 
An added restriction was the imposition of interest rate ceilings. Ceilings were 
imposed on both deposit and lending rates. To support this, the RBZ's own rediscount 
rate remained unchanged throughout the entire decade.25 These artificially low 
interest rates would not have adversely affected the level of savings and financial 
deepening had the inflation rate remained below the interest rates level. However, 
throughout the decade, the inflation was persistently above the nominal deposit rate. 
Consequently, real deposit rates were negative during most of the 1980s as Figure 18 
indicates. 
While Zimbabwe's negative real deposit rates were not attractive, they were not as 
low as they were in other SSA countries such as Zambia. At one stage in 1989, real 
deposit rates in Zambia sank to -117.3 percent. In Zimbabwe, however, the average 
gap between the nominal deposit rate and the inflation rate was a comparatively 
modest -4.1 percent and was never higher than -10 percent in any particular year. 
24 The bulk of this expencliture was in bailing out loss-making parastatals, debt repayments, health, 
education and defence. 
25 The rediscount rate was raised to 9 percent from 4.5 percent in 1981 in line with IMF advice to 
curtail inflationary pressure. It remained at 9 percent for the rest of the decade. 
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Figure 18: Real deposit rates in Zimbabwe(% p.a.), 1980-97 




-2 \ -c:: -4 G) 






-16 . --·· . ··- .. ... . --~- · ·· · · 
0 C\J """ 
(0 co 0 C\J 
""" 
(0 
co co co co co (J) (J) (J) (J) 
(J) (J) (J) (J) (J) (J) (J) (J) (J) 
..- ..- ..- ..-
Source: International Financial Statistics Yearbook, IMF (1996) 
This, coupled with the RBZ's contractionary monetary policy, should have prevented 
inflationary expectations from taking root and should not have considerably 
diminished the rate of financial intermediation. 
The fall in financial deepening can also be explained by the taxation of the interest 
earned on deposits. The 'real' rates depicted in Figure 18 do not account for this 
taxation. It is difficult to calculate the 'post-tax real return' on interest-bearing 
deposits. This is because different depositors are liable for different rates of taxation. 
Harvey (1998) notes that since the marginal tax on interest ranged between 17 and 28 
percent, even in the three years when real deposit rates were positive, taxation would 
have eliminated any positive returns. Thus for the entire decade, real after-tax returns 
on deposits were negative for most depositors. 
Predictably, the major effect of negative real rates of return was a drop in the level of 
financial deepening as a glance at the ratio of 'M3' to gross domestic product 
highlights. Similarly, the ratio of interest-bearing deposits to gross domestic product 
fell from 52 percent in 1980 to just under 38 percent by 1990 (RBZ Quarterly 
Bulletin). 
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4.2 Empirical test of the McKinnon-Shaw~Hypothesis 
Data sources 
Data for the testing procedure has been extracted from various issues of the RBZ's 
Quarterly Economic & Statistical Review. The use of quarterly instead of annual data 
is preferred because the accuracy of the testing increases with more data points. The 
data set runs from 1980 to 1997 and only real variables will be used. A dummy 
variable has been inserted to separate the period of financial repression (1980-90) 
from the period of financialliberalisation (1991-97). 
Only the results of certain statistics are shown in this chapter. Full results of the 
regression tests are tabled in an appendix at the end of this paper. 
Results of testing 
4.2.1. McKinnon's Money Demand Theory 
Also known as the 'complementarity hypothesis', this is McKinnon's explanation of 
how the real deposit rate (real interest rate) affects savings and ultimately investment 
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and growth. McKinnon asserts that since potential investors in developing countries 
are compelled into 'self-financing' their projects due to the paucity of external sources 
of finance, they must accumulate money balances on their own prior to investment. 
Thus the higher the rate of return on investment (i.e. the real interest rate), the more 
attractive the process of accumulating money becomes and hence the greater the 
incentive to invest. McKinnon's basic complementarity between money and physical 
capital is specified as (McKinnon 1973, p.59) : 
Md (P = f ( Y/P, 1/Y, d-rce) 
+ + + 
where: 
Md (P = the real money stock (M3) 
Y!P = real gross domestic product (GDP) 
I I Y = the ratio of gross domestic investment to GDP 
d-n = real deposit rate of interest (the twelve month fixed deposit rate) 
Theoretically, McKinnon's money demand specification seems correct for a country 
such as Zimbabwe. Seidman asserts that approximately 70 percent of all private 
firms' working capital requirements are procured internally off the balance sheet. This 
means that investors are relying on their own accumulated savings to accommodate 
their capital needs. That is, most of Zimbabwe's investment is financed 'internally'. 
The test results are tabled below: 
Table 4: Results of McKinnon's demand for money theory 
-0.159991 






Adjusted R2 0.89 F-statistic 0.00000 
Certain aspects of the results are in accordance with McKinnon's 'complementarity 
hypothesis': 
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• The coefficients of the three explanatory variables are each positive. 
• The results indicate that the real deposit rate and real GDP are both significantly 
and positively related to the demand for real money balances. 
However, the ratio of investment to GDP is not a significant variable. A probability 
statistic of 0.6 implies that there is only a 40 percent chance of incorrectly stating that 
the ratio of investment to GDP is not significant. Lowitt (1996) also found this ratio to 
be insignificant in the context of South Africa. She concluded that the direction of 
causality in South Africa was opposite to the one suggested by McKinnon. That is, 
money demand causes interest rates and not the other way around. 
4.2.2. Shaw's Demand for Money Function 
Unlike McKinnon, Shaw points to external rather than internal finance as being the 
effective constraint on capital formation. Thus the hypothesis to be tested here 
contends that higher real interest rates induce increased savings deposits which then 
stimulate investment since credit is available. With greater financial intermediation a 
rise in the average efficiency of investment also occurs. The notion that higher interest 
rates can stimulate higher, and more efficient, investment is explained by Shaw: 
with more savings deposits financial intermediaries can then raise real returns to 
savers and, at the same time, lower real costs to investors by accommodating liquidity 
preference, reducing risk through diversification, reaping economies of scale in 
lending, increasing operational efficiency and lowering information costs to both 
savers and investors through specialisation and division of labour (Shaw 1982, 
p.734)." 
The 'debt intermediation' view takes the following form (Shaw 1973, p.62): 
Md/P = f (YIP, v, d-n) 
+ + 
where: 
Md I P = the real money stock (M3) 
Y /P = real GDP 
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v = the opportunity costs, in real terms, of holding money (the 15 year bond 
yield). 
d-ne = real deposit rate of interest 
Table 5: Results of testing Shaw's demand for money theory 
-0.003290 
0.007372 
Durbin-Watson statistic 2.237896 
0.771284 
1.825882 
Adjusted R2 0.09 
0.4452 
0.0755 
F -statistic 0.0000 
The results of this test are unsatisfactory because of the low significance attached to 
the real deposit rate and the vector of opportunity costs. The adjusted R2 suggests that 
the independent variables explain only 9 percent of the total variation in money 
demand. This is evidence that Shaw's model is a poor specification of real money 
demand in Zimbabwe. 
The presence of two interest rates as independent variables is not explained by Shaw. 
This could be a possible source of mis-specification. Shaw's model was tested again 









Durbin-Watson 2.044128 Adjusted R2 0.88 F-statistic 0.0000000 
The model is once again incorrectly specified. The improved R2 can be discounted as 
it is largely due to the insertion of an autoregressive term (first order) to remove 
autocorrelation. While real GOP retains its significance, the sign on the coefficient for 
the 15-year government bond yield is incorrect. Furthermore, the significance of this 
variable is rather dubious. 
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3. Savings Function 
To date, the most detailed empirical testing of the McKinnon-Shaw savings function 
has been performed by Maxwell Fry (1978, p.466). The savings equation used by Fry 
is: 
Sd/Y = f (g, y, d-ne, Sf/y) 
+ + + + 
where: 
Sd/Y = real domestic aggregate savings/GDP 
g = growth rate of real GDP 
y = real GDP per capita 
d-ne = real rate of return on savings 
Sf/Y = foreign savings ratio 
Attempting to reduce savings into a regression equation is a contentious issue. It 
would be simplistic to state that any particular variables alone are the chief 
determinant of savings. This is because so many disparate factors have a direct 
bearing on a country's level of savings. Factors such as the level of innovation in the 
country, education standards and even the general psychological profile of people in a 
country can all impact on savings. However, for the purpose of this paper, the 
relationship between real deposit rates and real savings is particularly important. 
The Granger Causality Test was used to test the null hypothesis that the real deposit 
rate does not cause real total savings.26 The F-statistic was 4.519, while the 
probability of falsely rejecting the null hypothesis was only 0.00320. Thus, with 95 
percent certainty, one can make a strong case that the real deposit rate strongly affects 
the level of savings in Zimbabwe. In order to ensure that there was only one direction 
of causality between the two variables, a similar test was performed to test whether it 
is in fact savings that cause the real deposit rate and the test results rejected this 
proposition. With the F-statistic this test a low 1.541 and the probability statistic 0.2, 
the null hypothesis was accepted that real total savings in Zimbabwe do not cause real 
deposit rates. 
26 Savings are defined as all deposits with financial institutions excluding demand deposits (RBZ). 
63 
The significance of this relationship can be tested using the OLS regression 
procedure. Table 6 shows the results of regressing real savings against the real deposit 
rate. 
Table 6: Results of test to see if savings respond to deposit rates 
The causality determined by the Granger Causality Test is confirmed by the OLS 
regression estimation test. 
Results of Fry's version of the full savings model are just as significant: 






Durbin-Watson statistic 2.078697 Adjusted R2 0.75 F-statistic 0.000014 
Several conclusions can be drawn from these results: 
• The coefficient on the real deposit rate confirms that deposit rates are significant 
determinants of financial deepening in Zimbabwe. This is an important result 
since the financialliberalisation hypothesis stresses the role of deposit rates in 
boosting savings and other financial ratios. 
• The growth rate of real GDP is also significantly and positively related to savings. 
This suggests that income is also a determinant of savings. 
• The coefficient foreign savings ratio for the ratio of financial savings has the 
correct positive sign but it is not sufficiently significant. Thus, foreign savings 
have not been a significant influence on domestic savings. 
64 
4.2.3 Summary of tests 
This chapter attempted to determine whether the abolition of financial repression in 
Zimbabwe could be expected to induce greater financial deepening. The regression 
results revealed that the entire McK.innon-Shaw model is not perfectly specified for 
Zimbabwe. However, the results show that there is a persistently significant and 
positive relationship between real interest rates and the respective levels of money 
demand and savings. Because of this relationship, the lifting of interest rate controls 
should have encouraged financial deepening and enhanced economic growth as the 
model predicts. 
Furthermore, financial reforms were supposed to include the licensing of new 
commercial banks. This would increase competition amongst individual commercial 
banks and thus reduce the interest rate spread. That is, lower profits for commercial 
banks (due to lower lending rates) would be complemented by greater access to 
commercial bank credit for a larger proportion of the population. Thus, increased 
savings deposits due to higher deposit rates and increased access to credit due to more 
licensed banks would raise financial intermediation in Zimbabwe. 
Figure 20: Real deposit rates(% p.a.), real national savings, Zimbabwe 1980-90 
6000 ,... .. 
5000 
4000 i." (" c: 
0 I 






































Source: Quarterly Economic & Statistical Review, RBZ (various issues). 
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Chapter Five 
Explaining the lack of financial deepening 
This chapter will show that the freeing of interest rates did not induce greater financial 
deepening because the govenunent failed to contain inflation. In addition to this, the 
sequence of reforms was flawed. The anticipated increased competition between 
commercial banks did not materialise. This chapter will show that rather than 
lowering bank margins, commercial bank interest rate spreads actually increased due 
to the government's hesitation to issue new commercial bank licenses. 
5. 1. The absence of financial deepening 
An analysis of selected indicators of financial intermediation reveals that Zimbabwe's 
reforms have not been very successful. Indicators of financial deepening from twenty 
three selected SSA countries and from OECD countries were compared with those 
achieved in Zimbabwe. Figures 21-24 illustrate show that Zimbabwe's financial 
intermediation ratios are far inferior to those of OECD. Of greater concern, Zimbabwe 
lags behind the SSA average in several categories. 
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Figure 23: Broad money in percent of GDP, 1985-96 
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While Zimbabwe has certainly improved each ratio from its pre-refonn (1985-89) 
average, the current level of financial deepening is still far behind that of the OECD 
countries. Zimbabwe's 'deposits to gross domestic product' ratio is lower than the 
SSA average. This observation is supported by the fact that the ratio of savings to 
gross domestic product averaged 20 percent between 1991 and 1997 (RBZ 1998). In 
other words, this ratio has remained unchanged from its pre-refonn level. Zimbabwe's 
holding of reserves is abnonnally high. Its ratio of reserves to gross domestic product 
is higher than both the SSA average and the OECD average. Reserves are essentially 
a tax on the financial system as resources tied up in reserves cannot be used to expand 
the financial intennediation process. 
5.2. Explaining the lack of financial deepening 
The following section puts forward several explanations of why interest rate 
liberalisation did not significantly improve financial deepening in Zimbabwe. 
5.2.1 Failure to achieve important pre-conditions for reforms 
To be successful, financial refonns must be sequenced correctly. The Villanueva-
Mirhakhor framework states that a country should consider its current level of 
macroeconomic stability as well as the strength of its supervisory framework before it 
frees interest rates. According to the framework: 
countries with unstable economies with inadequate bank supervision should first 
achieve macroeconomic stability and strengthen the bank supervisory framework 
before liberalising interest rates" 
While Zimbabwe falls into this category, it failed to achieve the pre-conditions before 
freeing its interest rates. 
a) Macroeconomic Stability 
Low inflation and a low fiscal deficit are key characteristics of a stable 
macroeconomic milieu. Low inflation rates enable positive (but moderate) real 
interest rates, lower the risk premium on holding financial assets and increase the 
information content of financial variables (Chigumira 1998). A responsible fiscal 
policy enhances the credibility of financial reform. Indeed, a frugal fiscal regime is 
seen as evidence of the government's commitment to allow financial intermediaries a 
greater role in the economy with less government intervention. 
• Budget Deficits 
Financial liberalisation typically reduces the revenue a government can generate from 
financial repression. As interest rate controls are lifted, the cost of servicing 
government debt increase. Unless the government can tap other compensating 
revenue sources, the possibility exists that the budget deficit will rise. If the 
government decides to monetise this deficit increased inflation is likely. 
The indicators during the first phase of the reform programme in Zimbabwe reveal a 
growing budget deficit (see Table 8). At the onset of reforms in 1990, Zimbabwe's 
budget deficit was 8.6 percent of its budget deficit. A commitment was made by the 
government to reduce this figure to 5 percent by 1995. However, by 1995/96 this 
percentage had actually increased to 9.4 percent. That is, it was nearly twice as high 
as the optimal 5 percent target. The synchronisation of financial liberalisation and a 
decreasing budget deficit simply did not happen in Zimbabwe. 
69 
Table 8: Budget deficit and interest on government debt as percentage of gross 
domestic product, Zimbabwe 1989-97. 
Source: RBZ (1998) 
Contributing to this deficit problem was the government's rising expenditure. The 
government's real expenditure during the reform phase (1991-97) was 20 percent 
higher than in the pre-reform decade (1980-90). 
At the root of this rising expenditure was the government's support for loss-making 
parastatals. With the removal of interest rate ceilings, rising interest rates worsened 
these parastatals' debt burden. The cost of servicing loans and the cost of new credit 
was increasing at a time when parastatals' balance sheets were already unhealthy 
(Harvey 1998). 
Besides facing a harder budget constraint, poor management and inflexible strategies 
in a changing milieu worsened the plight of parastatals. In 1994/95, parastatallosses 
totalled Z$ 2 billion and Z$ 1.8 billion in 1995/96 (Harvey). 
Faced with such losses, the government should have hastened the privatisation of 
these public entities. This would not only have presented the government with a 
capital windfall, but it would have placed the parastatals on a more commercial 
footing. However, the government opted to use subsidies and distress borrowing to 
keep its parastatals barely afloat. 
This proved a costly exercise. In 1994/95 alone, the government took up parastatal 
debts valued at Z$ 4.2 billion (RBZ). Government support for parastatals would 
adversely affect the direction of domestic credit extension. As Fry (1996) notes, in 
1995 domestic credit to the private sector increased by 18 percent (a decline in real 
terms); by 39 percent for parastatals and by 106 percent for the government. 
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Table 10: Rapid expansion in the number of financial institutions, 
Nigeria 1985-92 
Source: Soyibo 1997 
The solvency of many of Nigeria's financial institutions was dubious while the 
portfolios of banks were replete with non-perfonning assets. The supervisory efforts 
of Nigeria's central bank were also impeded by the constant threat of ad hoc 
intervention by the military authorities. The issue of policy reversals, policy 
credibility and consistency is thus inextricably linked to issues of supervision and 
monitoring. 
Zimbabwe appears to have made the same mistake as Nigeria. The government only 
began piecing together new banking legislation in 1991-the same year that the 
financial refonn process began. That is, the supervisory framework was not 
strengthened prior to reforms. 
Commercial banks in Zimbabwe operate within the legal framework of the Banking 
Act of 1964. In accordance with this Act, the RBZ supervises commercial banks 
through the Inspector of Banks. The licensing of banks, however, is perfonned by the 
Ministry of Finance through the Registrar of Banks & Financial Institutions. 
Licensing and supervision are thus not co-ordinated within the same structure. In 
appraising a commercial bank's overall soundness, the RBZ employs the CAMEL 
(capital adequacy, asset quality, managerial competence and liquidity level) rating 
system. However, this supervisory framework could not avert the 1997 collapse of 
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United Merchant Bank.27 A survey (Moyo 1998) indicated that most financial 
institutions believe this bank failure could have been averted had new banking 
legislation been enacted prior to liberalisation. Weaknesses in the current Banking Act 
include the following: 
• The division of supervision and licensing between the RBZ and the Ministry of 
Finance undermines the RBZ's effectiveness. When issuing licenses the Ministry 
does not confer with the RBZ; the RBZ is thus seen as operationally weak, with 
very little autonomy. 
• There is no precedent of a banking license being revoked. If the RBZ identifies 
irregular bank behaviour it is only empowered to offer advice. It can not punish 
corrupt or reckless behaviour by revoking, suspending or restricting licenses. Even 
fining offenders is beyond the RBZ's authority. Many banks operate well below 
the required Basle capital adequacy ratios28 and yet the RBZ can only advise these 
offenders. The problems at UMB were well known to the RBZ but it could not 
take decisive action to prevent the bank's demise. 
• The RBZ relies heavily on off-site supervision and moral suasion. This makes it 
easier for banks to conceal non-performing loans through balance sheet 
manipulations. 
• The Act has no provision for deposit insurance. Instead there is an implicit 
understanding of a 'safety net' amongst banks. 
The above flaws of the Banking Act highlight the need for an innovative regulatory 
framework" and re-invigorated supervisory capacity" (Chigumira 1998, p.23). This 
need will be even greater as new financial products emerge and as the domestic 
financial sector is assimilated into the global financial system. The new banking 
legislation is supposed to address these issues but seven years after considering 
changes to the Banking Act, nothing tangible has been achieved. Such delays 
diminish the credibility of the reform process. 
27 United Merchant Bank's (UMB) bankruptcy in 1997 nearly sparked wide-spread financial chaos. 
The bank had illegally underwritten loans by issuing fake promissory notes. UMB was one of many 
non-commercial bank financial institutions which emerged after 1991. 
28 In 1992 commercial banks in Zimbabwe bad risk-weighted ratios between 5.3% and 11.8%. These 
ratios are below the Basle benchmark of 12 %. 
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5.2.2 Failure to license new banks 
Financialliberalisation is associated with the abolition of interest rate controls and 
subsequently higher interest rates. However, the simultaneous increase in the number 
of new commercial banks raises competition sufficiently to keep interest rates low. 
Financialliberalisation raised interest rates in Zimbabwe but there was no 
proportional increase in the issuing of commercial bank licenses. Consequently, the 
oligopolistic character of the commercial banking sector remained. In addition, the 
banks increased their profit margins. Between 1985-90 the average margin (spread) 
between the lending rate and the deposit rate was 3.8 percent. In the period 1993-
1997, the average spread rose to 10.1 percent. This large increase in the spread 
indicates that commercial banks were profiteering29 . 
The government was expected to use financial liberalisation as an opportunity to issue 
licences to indigenous commercial banks. This would have yielded several benefits: 
• First, the new indigenous banks would compete for deposits and in so doing 
induce established banks to improve their financial products and/or to lower their 
costs. 
• Second, the provision of credit to smaller scale borrowers would have increased 
because the indigenous banks possess better knowledge of small scale borrowers 
than established banks (especially with foreign management). That is, there is less 
information asymmetry. 
• Finally, the small capital bases of new indigenous banks would have left them 
with capacity sufficient for small-scale lending only. 
By 1995, fifteen years after independence, there were still no indigenous commercial 
banks in Zimbabwe. 
5.2.3 Reasons for non-appearance of indigenous banks 
• Deliberately conservative licensing policy 
29 The extent of profiteering is not as high as the spread. The spread is a direct function of the degree of 
competition as well as the level of the statutory reserve ratio. Thus the higher spreads of the 1990s 
reflect financialliberalisation plus the increase in reserve bank statutory ratios. 
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Of all the SSA countries, Zimbabwe's licensing policy was the most conservative 
(Harvey 1998). It seems that the authorities in Zimbabwe were anxious to avert the 
problems that other SSA countries had encountered as a result of their liberal 
licensing policies. This risk-averse behaviour helps to explain the lack of indigenous 
banks. A typical license application would be sent to The Registrar of Banks in the 
Ministry of Finance. The Registrar would examine the applicant's business plan, the 
calibre of the proposed management team and the applicant's ability to mobilise 
resources. If the Registrar is satisfied, the application then goes to a panel with 
representatives from the Ministry of Finance and from the Auditor- General. The 
process is not only slow, but it provides numerous chances to reject applications. 
• High minimum starting capital requirement 
Many potential applicants found the minimum capital requirement prohibitively high. 
The banking legislation of 1965 required Z$0.5 million as minimum capital. 
However, inflation since 1965 pressed the authorities into raising the requirement to 
Z$15 million. Numerous African businessmen have found this amount impossible to 
raise (Moyo 1998). 
• Easier to start non-bank financial institutions 
Licensing policy seemed more liberal for non-commercial bank financial institutions. 
For example, the authorities set the initial capital requirement for merchant banks at 
Z$10 million, and that for discount houses at Z$5 million. Furthermore, other types of 
institutions faced lower overhead expenses. A merchant bank or a discount house 
could be run from a rented office in the cheaper parts of Harare, whereas commercial 
banks required larger banking premises and elaborate equipment for customer use. 
The entry cost for non-banking institutions was thus reduced. 
Harvey (1998) suggests that the authorities perceived non-bank institutions as less 
risky because they took no deposits from individuals. Additionally, non-bank 
institutions were unlikely to accumulate portfolios of doubtful debt because they 
invested mainly in government paper and placed deposits with other financial 
institutions. Commercial banks on the other hand, take deposits from the public which 
the authorities have a duty to protect. Consequently, between 1991 and 1997, only 
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two new commercial banks were licensed compared to ten new merchant banks, and 
six discount houses. 
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Conclusion 
Financial repression was officially used in Zimbabwe from 1980 until the end of 
1990. Interest rate and foreign exchange controls were stringently enforced during this 
period. The government had hoped that the availability of cheap credit would fulfil 
the socio-economic aspirations of those who had been previously denied credit. 
Artificially low interest rates would reduce borrowing costs, while the government's 
control of foreign exchange would be used to supply credit to priority sectors'. These 
measures were preferred to imposing directed lending provisions on commercial 
banks. 
The literature review identified dangers inherent in financial repression. The most 
perverse dangers being: 
• negative real interest rates 
• declining savings 
• dis-intermediation 
Zimbabwe encountered each of the above during the era of financial repression. The 
majority of people were still without access to credit, while government controls in 
the financial sector may have undermined confidence in the holding of financial 
assets. 
Financial reform began with much optimism in 1991. Higher interest rates were 
expected to attract more savings deposits. The licensing of new indigenous banks 
would increase competition between banks and lower the cost of credit for potential 
borrowers. 
This paper found sufficient empirical justification for such optimism in Zimbabwe. 
The McKinnon-Shaw framework was used to test whether real deposit rates are 
significantly and positively related to savings and to the demand for money. While the 
entire framework was deemed to be unsatisfactorily specified for the Zimbabwean 
context, this was no cause for alarm since this is consistent with tests performed by 
other economists on developing economies. Indeed, the testing unearthed a positive 
and significant relationship between real deposits and real savings. 
However, in spite of this relationship, there was no significant increase in 
Zimbabwe's financial deepening. Zimbabwe's level of financial development is still 
very poor by First World standards and rather average by the standards of other SSA 
economies. 
The literature emphasised that freeing interest rates is a necessary but insufficient 
condition for successful financial reform. Certain pre-requisites must complement the 
removal of financial controls. These pre-requisites include macroeconomic stability 
and a sound system of financial sector supervision. 
Zimbabwe had not achieved macroeconomic stability prior to the policy shift in 1991. 
The paper found that the monetisation' of the budget deficit increased inflationary 
pressure. Inflation undermines the financial depening process as it erodes the value of 
financial assets. While positive real interest rates have been achieved, they have been 
associated with very high nominal interest rates. Such 'punitive' nominal lending 
rates may have reduced the demand for bank finance. This presented another obstacle 
for financial intermediation. 
The supervisory framework in Zimbabwe is weak and out-dated. The Banking Act 
has not been amended since 1965 and it is simply not in tune with modem financial 
markets. Furthermore, the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe is powerless to discipline 
dt:viant banks. This has created an authority vacuum in the banking sector. 
The anticipated proliferation of new did not occur. The government appears to have 
adopted a conservative attitude to licensing new commercial banks. As a result, the 
traditional banks have not faced any new competition. It had been hoped that 
increased competition in the banking sector would lower borrowing costs and 
promote financial innovation. Instead, commercial banks seem to have increased their 
profit margins. 
Appendix: Summary of McKinnon-Shaw Test Results 
A.l Mckinnon hypothesis -real variables 
Dependent Variable: RM3 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 07/03/99 Time: 22:52 
Sample(adjusted): 1980:2 1990:4 
Included observations: 43 after adjusting endpoints 
Convergence not achieved after 100 iterations 
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A.2 McKinnon's hypothesis- real logarithms 
Dependent Variable: LRM3 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 07/20/99 Time: 10:57 
Sample: 1980:1 1997:4 
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A.3 Real M3 against real deposit rate 
Dependent Variable: LRM3 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 08/02/99 Time: 03:49 
Sample(adjusted): 1980:2 1997:4 
Included observations: 71 after adjusting endpoints 
Convergence achieved after 10 iterations 







S.E. of regression 
Sum squared resid 
Log likelihood 
Durbin-Watson stat 




















Mean dependent var 
S.D. dependentvar 




A.4 Mckinnon's complete money demand model 
Dependent Variable: LRM3 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 08/02/99 Time: 03:53 
Sample(adjusted): 1980:2 1997:4 
Included observations: 71 after adjusting endpoints 
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A.5 Shaw's money demand function 
Dependent Variable: LGRM3 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 07/03/99 Time: 22:11 
Sample(adjusted): 1980:2 1990:4 
Included observations: 43 after adjusting endpoints 
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A.6 Shaw's alternative money function 
Dependent Variable: LRM3 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 08/02/99 Time: 04:04 
Sample( adjusted): 1980:2 1997:4 
Included observations: 71 after adjusting endpoints 
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A.7 Fry's Savings model (1981-1990) 
Dependent Variable: RTOTSAVGDP 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 07/04/99 Time: 21:48 
Sample( adjusted): 1981:2 1990:4 
Included observations: 39 after adjusting endpoints 
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A.B Savings regressed against the real deposit rate 
Dependent Variable: LRTOTSAV 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 07/04/99 Time: 21:17 
Sample( adjusted): 1981:3 1990:4 
Included observations: 38 after adjusting endpoints 
Convergence achieved after 5 iterations 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error 
c 8.732217 0.262221 
RDEPR 0.006382 0.002840 
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Inverted AR Roots .94 
A.9 Granger causality tests 
a) Real total savings and real deposit rate 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Date: 08/02/99 Time: 04:31 
























Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability 
RTOTSAV does not Granger Cause 
RDEPR 
RDEPA does not Grang,eJ Cause RTOTSAV 
63 1 .54153 0.20330 
4.51887 0.00320 
b) real financial savings and real deposit rate 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Date: 08/02/99 Time: 04:36 
Sample: 1980:1 1997:4 
La s: 4 
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability 
LRBSAV does not Granger Cause RDEPR 63 2.39398 0.06173 
RDEPR does not Granger Cause LRBSAV 4.42351 0.00243 
A.lO Fry's Savings Function (1981-1995) 
Dependent Variable: RTOTSAVGDP 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 08/02/99 Time: 16:18 
Sample(adjusted): 1981:3 1995:4 
Included observations: 58 after adjusting endpoints 
Convergence achieved after 8 iterations 









Adjusted A-squared 0.753311 
S.E. of regression 0.067003 
Sum squared resid 0.228961 
Log likelihood 78.20626 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.078697 








Mean dependent var 
S.D.dependentvar 



















Agenor, Pierre-Richard, and Peter J. Montiel. 1996. Development Economics. 
Princeton University Press, New Jersey. 
Bank of Zambia 1969. The Annual Report of the Bank of Zambia.' 
Bhagwati, J., 1978. 'Anatomy and Consequences of Exchange Control Regimes in 
Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic Development', Cambridge: NBER. 
Black, P., B.Standish, T.Hartzenberg 1997. 'Economics: Principles and Practice.' 
Pitman Publishing 
Brock, P.,L. 1989. 'Reserve Requirements and the Inflation Tax.' Journal of Money, 
Credit and Banking; February ; 106-21 
Brock, Philip L. 1984. Inflationary Finance in an Open Economy." Journal of 
Monetary Economics 14 (July): 37-53. 
Chigumira, Gibson. 1998. Financial Liberalisation in sub-Saharan Africa: Lessons 
for Zimbabwe." Paper presented at the conference, Zimbabwe: 
Macroeconomic Policy , Management and Performance Since Independence 
(1980-1998)." 
Davies, R., 1991. Cited in Harvey (1998), The Limited Impact of Financial Sector 
Reforms in Zimbabwe Since Independence.' Paper presented at the conference 
on: Zimbabwe -Macroeconomic Policy, Management and Performance Since 
Independence (1980-1998) 
Dornbusch, R., 1990. 'Policies to Move from Stabilisation to Growth.' CEPR 
Discussion Paper, No. 456, September. 
Fry, M.J. 1982. 'Models of Financially Repressed Developing Economies.' World 
Development, Vol. 10, No.9, September. 
Fry, M.J. 1978. 'Money and Capital or Financial Deepening in Economic 
Development.' John Hopkins University Press. 
Fry, Maxwell J. 1988. Money) Interest and Banking in Economic Development. 
Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press. 
Galbis, Vicente. 1979. Money, Investment, and Growth in Latin America, 1961-73." 
Economic Development and Cultural Change 27 (April): 423-43. 
Gillis, M., Perkins, D.,W., et al, 1992. Economics of Development. Third Edition, 
New York: W.W. Norton. 
85 
Giovannini, Alberto, and Martha de Melo. 1993. Government Revenue from 
Financial Repression." American Economic Review 83 (August): 953-63. 
Goverrunent of Zimbabwe. Various issues. 
Grosh, B., 1990. 'Parastatal-Led Development: the Financial Sector in Kenya', 1971-
87, African Development Review, 2 (2): 27-48. 
Gurley, J., and Shaw, E.S., 1960. 'Money in a Theory of Finance', Brookings 
Institute. 
Harvey, Charles, 1998. 'The Limited Impact of Financial Sector Reforms in 
Zimbabwe Since Independence.' Paper presented at the conference on: 
Zimbabwe -Macroeconomic Policy, Management and Performance Since 
Independence. 
Harvey, Charles. 1991. On the Perverse Effects of Financial Sector Reform in 
Anglophone Africa." South African Journal of Economics, vol. 59 (3): 258-
286. 
Keynes, J.M., 1936. The General Theory of Employment Interest and Money', St. 
Martins Press. 
Killick, T. 1991. Financial Management and Economic Development: Some Issues." 
South African Journal of Economics, vol.59 (3): 287-312. 
Llewellyn, D.T, G.E.J. Dennis, M.J.B. Hall and J.G. Nellis, 1982. The Framework of 
UK Monetary Policy', London: Heinemann. 
Lowitt, S., 'Financial Repression and Liberalisation: an application of the McK.innon-
Shaw Model to South Africa', Wits University 1996. 
Mandaza, I. (ed) 1986. Zimbabwe: The Political Economy of Transition 1980-1986.' 
CODES RIA 
Mathieson, Donald, and Liliana Rajas-Suarez. 1993. Liberalisation of the Capital 
Account: Experiences and Issues." Occasional Paper no. 103, International 
Monetary Fund (March). 
McKinnon, Ronald I. 1973. Money and Capital in Economic Development. 
Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution. 
Mehran, H., et al, 1998. 'Financial Sector Development in Sub-Saharan African 
Countries.' IMF Occasional Paper. 
Moyo, T., 1998. 'Zimbabwe's Experience With Monetary Management 1980-1996: 
Some Lessons for the Future.' Presented at the conference on: Zimbabwe-
Macroeconomic Policy, Management and Petformance Since Independence. 
86 
Nattrass, N., Khan, B., and L.Sharpe, 1995. Theory and Policy in South Africa.' 
David Philip. 
Ngugi, R.W. and J.W. Karubo, 1994. 'Financial Sector Reform: Interest Rate 
Liberalisation and the Mobilisation of Domestic Savings: the Kenyan 
Experience.' Paper presented at AERC workshop, Nairobi, Kenya. 
Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe. Quarterly Economic & Statistical Review. Various 
issues 
Roe, R.R., N.K. Sowa, 1997, 'From Direct to Indirect Monetary Control in sub-
Saharan Africa.' Journal of African Economies, Volume 6 (1) (AERC 
Supplement). 
Seidman, A., 1986. 'Money, Banking and Public Finance in Africa', Zed Press. 
Shaw, Edward S. 1973. Financial Deepening in Economic Development. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Soyibo, A., 1997. 'Financial Liberalisation and Bank Restructuring in sub-Saharan 
Africa: Some Lessons on Sequencing and Policy Design.' Journal of African 
Economies, Volume 6 (1) (AERC Supplement). 
Stiglitz, J.E. and A.Weiss, 1981. 'Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect 
Information.' American Economic Review, 71: 393-410. 
Tobin,. J., 1965. 'Money & Economic Growth'. Econometrica, vol. 33, Oct. 1965, pp. 
671-84. 
Villanueva, Delano, and Abbas Mirakhor. 1990. Strategies for Financial Reforms." 
IMF Staff Papers 37 (September): 509-36. 
Vogel, Robert C., and Stephen A. Buser. 1976. Inflation, Financial Repression, and 
Capital Formation in Latin America." In Money and Finance in Growth and 
Development, edited oy Ronald I. McKinnon. New York: Marcel Dekker. 
Wilkins, Nick. 1993. Financial Repression: Do real interest rates determine savings 
and investment in South Africa?" Research Monograph, Economic Research 
Unit, University of Natal. 
World Bank 1997. World Development Report, Oxford University Press. 
